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Agency relationship is a term that can not be separated with business environment nowdays. 
Agency relationship is reffered as contractual relationship between the principal as an owner of 
the company and the agent as a manager who are trusted by the owner to make a decision 
regarding the company business (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency relationship may cause an 
agency conflict between the principal and the agent because they have different interest toward a 
company. To reduce the agency conflict, the principal needs to perform monitoring procedures to 
observe their agents. The monitoring procedures carried by the principal raise the agency costs. 
One form of agency costs are costs that incurred to perform audit procedures by the third parties 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
 Related to the audit procedure, before performing audit procedures, the auditor will 
assess the company’s risks (Ghosh and Tang, 2015). The higher the audit risk assessed by the 
auditor, the higher the audit effort required to generate appropriate audit opinion (Bedard & 
Johstone, 2004). Therefore, the risk of audit will determine how much the audit fees to be paid 
by the company measured by how much effort is required by the auditor to perform the audit 
procedure. One form of audit risk assessed by the auditor is inherent risk attached to the 
company. The definition of inherent risk itself is the risk that assessed by the auditor in a 
company before considering the effectiveness of company’s internal controls (Tuanakotta, 2013). 
 On the other hand, companies with political connection are associated with the higher of 
inherent risks (Gul, 2006) because the existence of political connections within the company 
increases the incidence of fraudulent practices committed by the company. Supporting this 
statement, Faccio (2006) argues that firms with political connection are associated with the 
practice of expropriation against minority shareholders. It can occur because politically 
connected firms have a potential chance to provide political donations to legislative candidates 
so that later elected legislative members can create policies that are beneficial for their 
companies (Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998). However, oftenly political donations which are 
given by the companies are not through the approval of all shareholders, meanwhile the funds or 
the resources are possessed by the shareholders as a whole (Faccio, 2006). Therefore, the 
practice of expropriation against the minority shareholders is believed to occur in politically 
connected firms. Moreover, the existence of political connections is also linked to earnings 
management practices (Chaney et al, 2011). Because of the fraudulent practices within the 
politically connected firms such as practice of expropriation and the practices of earnings 
management, they are associated with a low level of transparency in their financial statements 
(Walker & Reid, 2002). Lack of transparency also has implications for the poor quality of 
financial statements that eventually will result in high risk of material misstatement on their 
financial reporting (Kan, 2006). The higher the risk, the higher the efforts required by the auditor 
to give an appropriate audit opinion.  As a consequence the auditor will charge higher audit fees 
(Gul, 2006). 
 In addition to the existence of political connections within the company, there is another 
factor that can also influence the audit fees which is the effectiveness of GCG (Good Corporate 
Governance). Speaking of good corporate governance, the corporate governance principles 
drafted by the OECD, have one principle about the responsibility of the board as the supreme 
leader of a company that has the oversight function. To carry out their oversight function, the 
Boards may establish committees under them, one of which is the Audit Committee. 
 Regarding the effectiveness of Board of Commissioners and the effectiveness of the Audit 
Committee, previous studies found that there are different directions about its effect on audit 




fees. Research which is conducted by Yatim et al (2006) found that the independence of the 
Board of Commissioners and the competence of the Audit Committee are positively associated 
with audit fees due to the existence of Independent Commissioners and the presence of the Audit 
Committees who have expertise in accounting and finance are considered being able to provide 
surveillance system which is more objective. Effective monitoring system will result a demand 
for better audit quality. It will later have implications for the larger audit fees (Hay et al, 2006). 
On the other hand, the study conducted by Li and Wang (2006) in China found the opposite 
result where the independence of the Board of Commissioners is negatively correlated to audit 
fees charged by the auditor. This is because the auditors believe that the BOC who is more 
independent have more effective supervision levels, causing a lower risk regarding the internal 
control of the company. With the lower of control risks, the audit procedures required as 
substantive testing can also be reduced and ultimately impact on the reduction of audit fees 
(Knechel & Willekens, 2006). 
Associated with audit fees, to maintain their independence and integrity, Public 
Accounting Firms need to be made a guide in terms of the determination of the audit fees in 
order to avoid alow audit fees determined by the auditors that can reduce their integrity since 
they might perform the procedure below the standard (Indonesian Audit Standard Setter/IAPI, 
2015). In Indonesia itself, policy on the determination of the audit fees already contained in the 
decree of IAPI No: KEP.024 / Certified / VII / 2008 about Policy Determination of Audit Fees. 
However, as revealed by IAPI in its report in 2016 that the application of the regulation 
mechanism is not optimal until today where there are still many Certified Public Accountants 
who do not disclose how they determine the amount of audit fees to be received. Therefore, IAPI 
in 2016 plans to issue a new decree revision in order to further guide as a reference, the amount 
of audit fees charged to the client. Given these rules have not been effectively implemented in 
Indonesia until 2016, then the audit fees determination factor in Indonesia still be an interesting 
theme to be researched. So, the purpose of this study is to provide empirical evidence of the 
factors that are believed to affect the audit fees which are the existence of political relations on a 
firm and effective supervision by the Board of Commissioners as well as the effectiveness of the 
Audit Committee. 
The Research Gap from previous study is the using of the effectiveness of Board of 
Commissioner and Audit Committee instead of good corporate governance index as a whole 
such as in Wahab et al (2011). This study will be focus on BOC and Audit Committee’s 
effectiveness in doing their surveillance system as one element of corporate governance that 
believed as the most influential factor to determine audit fees. Considering that BOC and Audit 
Committee have an authority to communicate with the auditor and to determine the scope of the 
audit work.  
  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
The Agency Theory 
One form of agency costs that need to be issued by the principal is the bonding cost (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Bonding costs itself are the costs incurred to create a guarantee that all actions 
taken by the management are aligned with the interests of shareholders, such as the costs for 
audit procedures (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). De Angelo (1981) argued that the costs of 
conducting the audit process are the most effective agency costs. Besides, it  also stated that the 
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costs for auditing are the smallest costs to reduce the conflict between principal and agent as well 
as conflicts between shareholders (majority vs. minority shareholders). 
 
Audit Risks and Audit Fees 
Before performing the audit procedures, auditor needs to conduct an assessment of the risks that 
are owned by the company (Ghosh and Tang, 2015). The risk assessment is the analysis 
performed by the auditor about the relevant risks associated with the preparation of company’s 
financial statements (Arens et al, 2012). Audit risk is the risk of giving improper audit opinion 
regarding firm’s financial statement (Tuanakotta, 2013). One of the audit risks is the inherent 
risk attached to the company. Inherent risk is vulnerability of an assertion is either on the types 
of transactions, account balance, or disclosure of the material misstatements that may own or 
incorporated without taking into account related control of the company (Tuanakotta, 2013). One 
form of inherent risk is the risk associated with the practice of fraud committed by management 
(Tuanakotta, 2013). 
Taking into account the audit risk, auditor will determine the audit fees charged to the 
firm reflected on how much effort is required to perform audit procedures. Simunic (1980) 
developed a model which states that the audit fee is a function of audits (audit effort) and the risk 
of the auditor on the client's business (risk premium) where the higher the risk of audit 
considerated by the auditor, the higher the fee audit will be charged to the client because the 
amount of effort required to perform audit procedures. However, it is necessary to note that the 
determination of audit fees is not only from the point of view of the auditor as a provider of 
auditing services, but there is also the client's role as a party to use the services of audit in 
determining the audit fees they are willing to pay (Hay et al, 2006). The statement was later 
described by two theories. 
The first theory is the supply-side theory that gives the view that the determination of the 
audit fees is based on the auditor's decision as a provider of audit services required by the client. 
So that the auditor has a role determining the audit fees to be paid depends on the variables 
attached to the clients seen through the viewpoint of the auditor. Examples of variables that 
assessed by the auditor to its client are the inherent risks of the client, and the client business 
complexity (Hay et al, 2006). For instance, if the auditor sees that a company has too many audit 
risks or even too complex, they will ask for higher audit fees paid by the client since they think 
that they will do more through audit procedures toward this company (Hay et al, 2006).  
On the other hand, demand side theory itself explains how the client plays a role in 
determining the amount of audit fees they're willing to pay. So the amount of audit fees is not 
only determined by the auditor solely as a provider of audit services, but is also determined by 
the client as the parties who use their services (Hay et al, 2006). For example, a company who 
has effective good corporate governance implementation usually ask for a better audit quality to 
the auditor, so eventhough from the perspective of the auditor this company is less risky compare 
to other companies, the audit fees determined by them will usually higher than others because 
they need to perform more audit procedures in order to fulfill their demand to have better audit 
quality. Moreover, the company is also willing to pay higher audit fees in exchange for better 
audit quality. So, instead of less audit fees determined by the auditor because of the lower risks 
assessed by the auditor, the firms who implement good corporate governance might pay for 
higher audit fees because of the existence of demand side effect for a better audit quality (Hay et 
al, 2006). 
 




Corporate Governance Theory and Political Theory 
Corporate governance is the relationship between the organs of companies consisting of 
management, the Board of Directors, Board of Commissioners, shareholders, and other 
stakeholders, to achieve the objectives of the company and is expected to provide value added 
for shareholders by taking into account other stakeholders (NCG 2006; IICG, 2009). To realize 
good corporate governance, each organ of the company has a different role, but they are 
interacting with each other. BOC as one of the organs of the company has the function to 
monitor the performance of the Board of Directors as specified in the UU PT No.40/ 2007. To 
achieve good corporate governance, the Board of Commissioners needs to ensure that oversight 
mechanisms do have run effectively. It is kind of adherence to the principles of the OECD 
number sixth which mentioned that good corporate governance should ensure the availability of 
effective supervisory mechanisms on the management by the Board of Commissioners. 
Therefore, the internal control performed by the Board of Commissioners is an essential element 
in achieving good corporate governance. 
BOC have very important role in achieving good corporate governance as they have a 
responsibility to ensure that the management has implemented adequate internal control 
procedures and prepared financial reports reliably (Arens et al, 2012). Therefore, the presence of 
the Board of Commissioners who perform their oversight function effectively can improve the 
quality of the company's financial statements (Muller, 2014). 
Related to perform surveillance functions according to UU PT No.40/2007, the Board of 
Commissioners may establish committees under them, including the Audit Committee, 
Nomination Committee and Remuneration Committee. According to the Keputusan Ketua 
Bapepam No: Kep-29 / PM / 2004 dated 24 September 2004 in conjunction with POJK 55/ 
POJK.04/2015 each public company listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange must have an Audit 
Committee. This means that every public company since 2004 is required to have an Audit 
Committee in order to assist the Board of Commissioners regarding their oversight function. The 
role of the Audit Committee is very important in helping the oversight function performed by the 
Board of Commissioners, mainly concerned with the supervision of the information on the 
financial statements issued by the management as one of the duties of the Audit Committee 
based on Keputusan Ketua Badan Pengawas Pasar Modal Nomor: Kep-29/PM/2004 dated 24 
September 2004 in conjuction with Peraturan OJK No.55/POJK.04/2015 which examines the 
financial information that will be issued by the company. 
In the other hand political theory in corporate governance explains that the existence of 
political connections within the company can influence the corporate governance structure and 
policy direction to be taken by the company (Pound, 1993). The theory also said that the 
existence of political connections characterized by any government involvement in the company 
may affect the mechanism of corporate performance (Hawley and William, 1996). Research 
conducted by Fisman (2001) suggest that political connections can be used as a tool to gain 
access from the government during the transition period, in which the economic system tends to 
be unstable and are associated with the value of the company. In addition, research conducted by 
Goldman et al (2010) showed that firms with political connections get ease regulations as well as 
the ease in obtaining government projects. Based on these studies it can be concluded that the 
existence of political relations within the company is believed to affect corporate performance 
through regulatory clearances, as well as the ease of getting a government project. 
 However, the advantages gained by politically connected firms raise political costs. A 
study shows that the presence of political connections can lead to exploitation and manipulation 
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of political donations were given to the government or parties to make policies that are beneficial 
for their company, in the case of public companies, funds provided by the management, are 
owned by shareholders (Ramsay, Stapledon and Vernon, 2001). In addition, the politically 
connected firms are also associated with rent seeking behavior (Fisman, 2001). Therefore, 
political connections within the company may eventually trigger the expropriation activities 
against the minority shareholders because the funds given to conduct rent seeking activities do 
not always go through the approval of all shareholders despite expended funds are funds held by 




Impacts of Political Connections on Audit Fees 
Goldman et al (2010) found that the presence of political connection within the company can 
impact the performance of the company through the leniency regulation / policy and the ease in 
obtaining government projects. However, the advantages gained by the politically connected 
firms require costs. That is because to get the advantages, companies need to do rent seeking 
activity that is activity to lobby the authorities to create favorable policies for their companies in 
which this activity require funds or resources owned by the company (Fisman, 2001; Johnson 
and Mitton, 2002) , The resources provided in the form of donations to the government or party-
related work to make favorable policies for their companies pose a risk related to the exploitation 
and manipulation of the resources of the company because the donations itself do not always go 
through the approval of all shareholders, including minority shareholders (Ramsay, Stapledon 
and Vernon, 2001). Therefore, the existence of political connections within companies is often 
associated with practice of expropriation against minority shareholders and practices of earnings 
manipulation (Chaney, 2011). 
This causes managers in politically connected firms have no incentive to do transparency. 
This is consistent with research conducted by Walker and Reid (2002) in Gul (2006) who found 
that the existence of political connections trigger lack of transparency in their financial 
statements which in turn resulting in a lower quality of financial reporting. In line with this, 
Chaney et al (2011) also gave the evidence that political connections can be associated with a 
lower quality of financial reporting due to a lack of transparency. 
With the low quality of financial statements resulted by politically connected firms, it is believed 
that these firms have a higher inherent risk because there is a greater likelihood that a material 
misstatement occurred in the financial statements (2006). By the increase of auditor's assessment 
about the risk within the company including the inherent risk, the higher the audit effort required 
by the auditor to audit the company. Furthermore, a greater effort caused the auditor felt that they 
need to charge a larger amount of audit fees to the company (Gul, 2006). Therefore the 
politically connected firms are believed to pay audit fees greater than non-politically connected 
firms (Wahab, 2011). 
Based on the above explanation, this study will test the hypothesis of a positive 
relationship between the existence of political relations in the company and the audit fees paid by 
the company. 
 
H1: The existence of political connections can positively affect audit fees. 
 
 




The Impact of Effectiveness of Commissioners and the Audit Committee on Audit Fees 
Based on the structure of corporate governance in Indonesia, the Board is the highest organ of 
the company which has a supervisory function. To help carry out its oversight function, the 
Board of Commissioners may establish Committees below, namely the Audit Committee. 
Therefore, the effectiveness of supervision is in addition affected by the effectiveness of the 
company's Board also influenced by the effectiveness of the Audit Committee in helping to 
supervise. In relations with the audit fee, there are two arguments that describe the influence the 
effectiveness of supervision by the Board of Commissioners and the effectiveness of the Audit 
Committee of the audit fees. 
The first argument is referred to as supply side theory as seen through the perspective of 
auditors, where the higher the effective functioning of the supervisory Board of Commissioners 
and the effectiveness of the Audit Committee will be implicated in increasing the quality of 
corporate governance. That way, the auditor believes there is a lower inherent risk within the 
company and will eventually lead the auditor to reduce audit fees charged to the firm (Wahab et 
al, 2011). Several research support this theory, Fama et al (1983) in Yatim et al (2006)  found 
that the independence of the board as one of the characteristics of effective functioning of the 
supervisory board, provide mechanisms for oversight and effective control to reduce 
opportunistic behavior committed by managers and the practice of expropriation of the 
company's resources. As a result the auditor will reduce the substantive test that are needed and 
reduce audit fees to be charged (Knechel & Willekens, 2006). In addition, research conducted by 
Ittonen et al (2010) found that the composition of the audit committee which is more qualified is 
negatively related to audit fees charged. In that study Ittonen et al (2010) found that the 
composition of the audit committee that is qualified is believed to increase the level of oversight 
and internal control, thereby reducing the inherent risk which is owned by the company. Inherent 
risk that these smaller may ultimately reduce audit fees due to reduced substantive testing 
procedures that need to be done by the auditor (Knechel and Willekens, 2006). So overall, these 
studies found that the effectiveness of supervision by the Board of Commissioners and is assisted 
by the Audit Committee, is negatively related to the audit fees. 
On the other hand, demand side theory described by Hay et al (2006) tried to give 
arguments that the amount of audit fees to be paid by the companies is also determined by the 
company as a user. Hay et al (2006) states that there is demand side effect, resulting in a positive 
relationship between the implementation of good corporate governance, particularly in terms of 
supervision carried out by the Board of Commissioners and the audit fees. This is because the 
existence of an effective board can encourage companies / clients to obtain better audit quality 
will implicate for the high audit fees need to be paid (Hay et al, 2006). Therefore, according to 
Hay (2006) the existence of this theory then becomes an argument to explain why in previous 
studies as was done by Carcello et al (2002) as well as research conducted by Abbot & Parker 
(2000) found that having a board that is effective will have a positive relationship with the audit 
fees. 
Carcello (2002) found that the independence of the Board of Commissioners and the 
frequency of board meetings as a benchmark for effective oversight function are positively 
associated with audit fees. Another study conducted by Abbott & Parker (2000) found that there 
is a positive relationship between the existences of an independent board with the audit fees. The 
argument behind this statement is that the independent board will try their best to maintain their 
reputation and are willing to give a maximum effort in order to fulfill its function as a supervisor 
of the company. Therefore, they would be willing to pay a higher audit fees for greater audit 
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quality to protect their reputation and to avoid legal obligations as well as to promote the 
interests of other shareholders (Carcello et al, 2002). In addition to the effectiveness of the 
oversight function by the board, Lee and Mande (2005) found that the effectiveness of the Audit 
Committee also has a positive influence and significant impact on the amount of audit fees paid 
by companies. Based on these studies, it can be said that the characteristic function of effective 
oversight by the Board of Commissioners and the effectiveness of the Audit Committee proved 
to have a positive influence on the audit fees. Overall speaking, the arguments of the above 
studies that support this theory in line with the signaling theory in terms of the determination of 
the audit fee as disclosed by Wu (2012). Signaling theory described by Wu (2012) stated that the 
company would try to provide a signal to outsiders that they have implemented corporate 
governance seen by the effectiveness of the oversight function performed by the Board of 
Commissioners and is assisted by the Audit Committee. It is because they will ask for higher 
quality of audit services and ask for more thorough audit procedures. This in turn will have 
implications on the high amount of audit fees to be charged by the auditor. 
With these two conflicting arguments, from the viewpoint of the auditor - supply side 
theory and from the point of view of the client - the demand side theory (Hay et al, 2006) which 
explains the two different directions on the effect of the effectiveness of the supervisory 
functions of the Board of Commissioners and the effectiveness of the Audit Committee on audit 
fees, then this hypothesis is two tail. Therefore, it can be hypothesized: 
 





The research model used in explaining the hypotheses 1 and 2 in this study draws on research 
from Wahab et al (2011) with Malaysia as an object of research and Wu (2012) with China as 
research objects. The research model is as follows: 
AUDITFEEit = a0 + a1POLCONit + a2BOCACit + a3SIZEit+ a4SUBSit + a5CURRENTit + a6ROAit 
+ a7LIQUIDit+ a8LEVit +a9ALTMANit+ a10BIGNit + a11INSTOWNit+ a12MANOWNit + 
a13INDUSTRY + ɛit 
 
Where applicable: 
AUDITFEEit = Amount of audit fees that company pay to the 
auditors divided by 1.000.000.000. 
POLCONit = Political connections within the company. This 
variable is a dummy variable, one for companies that 
have political connections and 0 otherwise. 
BOCACit = Effectiveness of the Board of Commissioners and 
Audit Committee (measured by checklist of 
effectiveness of the Board of Commissioners and the 
Audit Committee developed by Hermawan (2009)). 
SIZEit = Total assets of the company divided by 
1.000.000.000. 
SUBSit = Number of subsidiaries that are directly owned by 
the company. 




CURRENTit = Ratio of current assets to total assets. 
ROAit = Return on Assets (ratio of net profit before tax to 
total assets). 
LIQUIDit = Ratio of current assets to current liabilities. 
LEVit = Ratio of total debt to total assets. 
ALTMANit = Altman z score measuring the probability of 
bankruptcy. 
BIGNit = Auditor who perform audit to the company, this 
variable is a dummy variable, one for companies 
using KAP Big 4, and 0 otherwise. 
INSTOWNit = Percentage shareholding of institutional investors. 
MANOWNit = Percentage shareholding of managerial ownership 
(directors and commissioners) 
INDUSTRYit = Dummy variables to control the effects of the 
industry. With a total of eight types of industries 





The dependent variable in this study is the cost of the audit or the audit fees. Data about the audit 
fees is taken from the annual reports of companies listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange from the 





In this study, a company classified to have political connections, if at least one of the company 
leaders (Board of Commissioners and Board of Directors), the majority shareholder (who has a 
stake above 10%) or their close relatives were / are being served as a member of parliament, 
minister, or head of state, or close to the top-level politicians as well as if there is government's 
stake in the company. The criteria used to define political connections referred to a study Faccio 
(2006); Chaney et al, (2011); and Guedhami et al, (2010). This variable is a dummy variable that 
is, a value of 1 if the company has a political connection, and 0 otherwise. 
There is an adjustment made on the criteria of political relations referenced in this study, 
which remove board members, directors or controlling shareholders of the incumbent or former 
of Indonesian Military Police of or the Indonesian Armed Forces in measurement. The reason to 
remove these criteria is the Army and Police, have no voice and political authority to choose and 
pick the top officials in the executive and the legislative, that’s means  have no political rights. 
This is in line with research conducted by Apriliani (2015). In addition, the close relationship to 
politicians in this research is limited to the core family relationships such as husband, wife, 
children, grandchildren, and siblings, in line with the research conducted by Faccio (2006). It is 
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Effectiveness of Board of Commissioner and Audit Committee 
To assess the effectiveness of the Board of Commissioner, this study using the checklist 
effectiveness from research conducted by Hermawan (2009), which measures the effectiveness 
of BOC by using a checklist effectiveness consisting of 17 points criterias and are classified into 
four categories, namely the independence of the Board of Commissioners, the activity of the 
Board of Commissioners, the size of the Board of Commissioners, and the competence of the 
Board of Commissioners. While the effectiveness of the Audit Committee consists of 11 items 
and grouped into three categories. These categories are activities of the Audit Committee, the 
size of the Audit Committee, and the competence of the Audit Committee membership. 
 
Control Variables 
Control variables used in this study first is a measure of the company size. Company size is 
predicted to have a positive relationship to the audit fees because the larger the size of the 
company, the higher the level of complexity of the audit company (Simunic, 1980). In this study, 
the size of the company will be assessed using the total assets of the company (Gul, 2006). The 
second control variables used in this study is the number of wholly owned subsidiary companies. 
Simunic (1980) argued that the subsidiary is one form of decentralization and diversification 
owned by a company that could potentially fail the firm. It has implications for higher company's 
business risks. Therefore, in this study it is predicted that there is a positive relationship between 
the numbers of subsidiaries to the audit fee. 
The next control variable is the ratio of current assets to total assets. Some components in 
the statement of financial position the company is considered to have higher risk levels than the 
other components (Simunic, 1980). In this case the current assets are considered to have a higher 
level of risk and audit procedures require more specialized and unspecialized (Wahab et al, 
2011). Therefore, as a consequence the auditor find it necessary to charge a fee against larger 
audit firms with the ratio of current assets to total assets greater (Wahab et al, 2011). 
Next is the control variable used to measure liquidity risk of companies. With the lower 
ability of the company's liquidity, it is predicted that the company is in a poor financial condition 
(Wahab et al, 2009). If the company is in poor financial condition, the company's going concern 
risk is higher and ultimately has implications for the larger audit procedures that need to be done 
by the auditor. The amount of high audit efforts will have implications on the high audit fees 
charged. Therefore, this is study predict that there is a negative relationship between the liquidity 
of companies with audit fees charged by the auditor. In addition to liquidity, there are other 
things that are also considered by the auditor to determine the risk inherent in the company, one 
of which is the company's degree of financial leverage. The higher a company's financial 
leverage, the higher the risk inherent in the company which is mainly related to the company's 
bankruptcy risk (Simunic and Stein, 1996). With the higher the risk assessed by the auditor, the 
higher audit fees to be charged by the auditor. Thus it is predictable that there is positive 
relationship between financial leverage of companies with audit fees charged by the auditor 
(Wahab et al, 2011). 
To control the condition of financial difficulties experienced by the company, this study 
uses Altman bankruptcy prediction model as in research conducted by Gul (2006) and Wahab et 
al (2011). The smaller score of the company, the more likely the company is experiencing 
financial difficulties. The higher the financial difficulties experienced by the company, the higher 
the risks are assessed by the auditor to the company. Therefore, it is predicted that the negative 




correlation between the values obtained from the Altman bankruptcy prediction model with the 
audit fees. 
This study is also using ROA to gauge profitability. Companies that have greater 
profitability are likely to choose an auditor with a better reputation in order to gain higher audit 
quality results and to provide a signal to outsiders that their company has had a good 
performance (Chaney & Shivakumar, 2004). So it is predicted that ROA has positive correlation 
with the audit fees. 
In addition, this study also uses variable size of public accounting firm that audited the company. 
Size of public accounting firms influence audit fees charged to clients for their monopoly power 
and the difference in the quality of audit provided by bigger publix accounting firms (Palmrose, 
1986). Therefore, it is predicted that larger public accounting firms charge higher audit fees than 
other public accounting firms. Size public accounting firms in this study were divided into two 
categories by using dummy variables. Where 1 for companies audited by a large public 
accounting firm that belong to Big 4, while 0 otherwise. 
This study also included institutional ownership and managerial ownership for control 
variables. In terms of the proportion of institutional ownership, this study predicts a positive 
influence on the amount of the audit fees charged. This is because as shareholders, institutional 
investors will ask for a higher quality of information, and as a result will ask for better quality 
audit to the auditor (Ali & Lesage, 2013). On the other hand, this study predicts a negative 
correlation between the proportions of managerial ownership in the company to the amount of 
audit fees charged (Wahab et al, 2011). It is due to the managerial ownership in the company 
will align the interests of agents and principals in order to reduce agency conflicts that occur 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). With the reduction of the agency conflict, it is expected to reduce 
audit risk assessed by the auditors and will result for lower audit fees charged (Fleming et al, 
2005). 
The last control variable used in this study is a type of industry. Some industries with 
certain characteristics have a higher degree of difficulty to carry out the audit process (Simunic, 
1980) in Wahab (2011). In research Goodwin-Stewart & Kent (2006) found that the mining 
industry proved to have higher audit fees than other industries. In addition to the research 
conducted by Wahab et al (2011) found that the industries that fall into the category of the 
construction industry, consumer goods, and technology have higher audit fees compared to other 
industries. Therefore, it can be said that this type of industry influence on the amount of audit 
fees paid to the auditor due to the different levels of difficulty and risks of each type of industry. 
Type of industries in this study refers to an industry classification made by IDX by dividing the 
company into eight types of industries. 
 
Population and Sample 
This research will use secondary data of companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange that 
disclose their audit fees in their financial statement. This study will observe companies in period 
of 2012 until 2015.  












Explanations 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Initial Sample 447 484 498 507 
Financial Industry (71) (74) (79) (87) 
Annual Report is Not Available (10) (6) (18) (27) 
Audit Fee is Not Available (272) (263) (253) (232) 
Total Companies 94 141 148 161 
Total Observation (Unbalanced Panel) 544 
 
 
Results and Analysis 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Based on descriptive statistics table below, it can be seen that the dependent variable in this 
research which is the audit fees have an average value of Rp 1.335 billion, -. This means that the 
average company in Indonesia in 2012 until 2015 to pay the amount of the audit fees of Rp 1.335 
billion, - to the auditor. The range is quite high on this variable, seen from the difference between 
the maximum and minimum value, illustrate that the sample of firms in this study represents the 
nominal amount of the audit fees from small to large. 
In addition, the descriptive statistics table below is also known that there are 182 
companies who have political connections or approximately 33.46% of the total sample. These 
results also support the research conducted by Faccio (2006) that there are more than 28% of 
companies in Indonesia are politically connected. 
A second independent variable in this study is the effectiveness of the Board of 
Commissioners and the Audit Committee as measured by checklist effectiveness of the Board of 
Commissioners and the Audit Committee which is used in research Hermawan (2009). The 
average value obtained from this variable is equal to 0.7847. The resuls showed that on average, 
companies sampled in the study have had value on effectiveness of the Audit Committee of the 
Board of Commissioners that is good enough or were above fair value in a study conducted by 
Hemawan (2009). Fair value on research Hermawan (2009) in the amount of 0.6667 obtained 
from the amount of the effectiveness of the Board of Commissioners and the Audit Committee if 
the company gets a value of 2 for each questions. 
 Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
  
Variable Average Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
AUDITFEE (Rp Juta) 1.335 1.828 44 10.512 
BOCAC 0,7847 0,0772 0,4404 0,9524 
SIZE (Rp Milyar) 8.827 12.832 47 61.024 
SUBS 4,5237 5,5523 0 29,575 
MANOWN 0,0242 0,0723 0,0000 0,3635 
CURRENT 0,4612 0,2377 0,0039 0,9626 
LIQUID 2,5233 5,3480 0,0116 67,4424 
ROA 0,0439 0,1060 -1,0721 0,4374 
LEV 0,2329 0,1846 0,0000 0,8918 
INSTOWN 0,0189 0,0343 0,0000 0,1414 
ALTMAN 1,6513 2,5788 -8,1299 11,7001 
 





Variable %Score 1 %Score 0 Total % 
POLCON (182) 33.46% (362) 66.54% (544) 100%  
BIGN (256) 47.06% (288) 52.94% (544) 100% 
INDAGRI (31) 5.7% (513) 94.3% (544) 100% 
INDMIN (69) 12.68% (475) 87.32% (544) 100% 
INDBASIC (96) 17.65% (448) 82.35% (544) 100% 
INDCONS (42) 7.72% (502) 92.28% (544) 100% 
INDMISC (39) 7.17% (505) 92.83% (544) 100% 
INDPROP (83) 15.26% (461) 84.74% (544) 100% 
INDINFRA (77) 14.15% (467) 85.85% (544) 100% 
INDTRADE (106) 19.49% (438) 80.51% (544) 100% 
AUDITFEE = total audit fees of a firm; POLCON = political connection that is owned by the company 
measured by using dummy variable; BOCAC = The effectiveness of the Board of Commissioners and Audit 
Committee score (Hermawan, 2009); SIZE = total assets of the company; SUBS = number of subsidiaries; 
MANOWN = percentage shareholdings of Directors and Commissioners; CURRENT = total current assets to 
total assets; LIQUID = total current assets to current liabilities; ROA = return on assets; LEV = total debt to 
total assets; BIGN = dummy public accounting firms Big 4 non-Big 4; ALTMAN = Altman z-score; 
INSTOWN = percentage of institutional ownership; INDAGRI = the agriculture industry; INDMIN = the 
mining industry; INDBASIC = base and chemical industry; INDCONS = consumer goods industry; INDMISC 
= other industries; INDPROP = construction property development, real estate, and building industry 




Result of tests performed on the model of this study showed that the result is consistent with the 
hypothesis that the first study stated that the existence of political connections are positively 
affect audit fees. Explanation of the result in this study is the existence of political relations 
within the company is believed to increase the inherent risk attached to the company (Gul, 2006). 
It is caused by the rent-seeking activities in companies with political connections (Faccio, 2006). 
Rent-seeking activities itself is an activity undertaken by politicians within the company by 
lobbying with the authorities and the government to influence policy-making process, which 
aims to benefit their company. 
Activities undertaken by the company with the political connections cause costs in the 
form of political donations and private payments (bribes) in return (Ramsay et al, 2001; Hellman 
et al, 2000). Private payments (bribes) and political donations will raise the practice of 
expropriation of the minority shareholders. Expropriation practices against minority shareholders 
arise when political donations are given without the consent of all shareholders, including 
minority shareholders, while political donations are company’s resources owned by the 
shareholders as a whole (faccio, 2006; Bliss et al, 2011). Therefore, to cover the practice of 
expropriation in the form of bribery, politically connected firm tend to have low transparency 
and also have the low quality of information in the financial statements (Bushman et al, 2004; 
Chaney et al 2011). 
With the low level of transparency and the poor quality of information in financial reports 
generated, a company that has political connections is believed to have a greater inherent risk, 
especially in the information in the financial statements presented. The high risk that the auditor 
assessed then the more audit procedures required such as substantive testing and gathering audit 
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evidence. As a result the auditor would increase the cost of the audit were higher in companies 
that have political connections (Gul, 2006). 
Result of tests performed on the second hypothesis in this study also shows that the 
second hypothesis is proved which states that the effectiveness of the Audit Committee and the 
effectiveness of Board of Commissioners have positive effect on audit fees.. 
In practice in determining the audit fees paid to auditor, is not only can be seen from the 
viewpoint of the auditor as audit service providers, but there is also the client's role in 
determining the audit fees that they are willing to pay (Hay et al, 2006). The role of the client in 
determining the audit fees paid referred to as a demand side effect. In this study the demand side 
effect proved to make a positive influence between the effectiveness of the Board of 
Commissioners and the Audit Committee and audit fees. 
This is because companies that have the Board of Commissioners and the Audit 
Committee who are more effective will encourage the company to get a better audit quality 
(Carcello et al, 2002; Lee & Mande, 2005). It is intended to maintain their reputation and to 
protect themselves from legal liability that may occur in the future because of the low level of 
supervision performed (Carcello et al, 2002; Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006). In addition, the 
Audit Committee who is more effective will also increase their demand for quality of audit by 
increasing coverage or scope of the audit (audit coverage) should be made by the auditors (Lee & 
Mande, 2005). With the demand for better audit quality and the demand for wider audit 
coverage, the company is willing to pay higher audit fees (Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006). 
Therefore, the result of this study supports the argument of the demand side theory which 
states that the higher the level of effectiveness of surveillance conducted by the Board of 
Commissioners and the higher the effectiveness of the Audit Committee to assist the Board of 
Commissioners to supervise management, the higher the demand for better audit quality. The 
demand for high audit quality will in turn affect higher audit fees charged by the auditor 
(Carcello et al. 2002; Bliss et al., 2011). 
 
Table 3 
 Regression Results 
Variabel Coefficient Sig Explanation 
POLCON 0,3902235 0,001*** Significant 
BOCAC 1, 017764 0,080* Significant 
SIZE 0,0000466 0,000*** Significant 
SUBS 0,081219 0,000*** Significant 
CURRENT -0, 012414 0,481 Not Significant 
ROA 0,7720022 0,005** Significant 
LIQUID -0, 001877 0,387 Not Significant 
LEV 0,1238569 0,342 Not Significant 
ALTMAN 0,0346735 0,008** Significant 
BIGN 0,6598435 0,000*** Significant 
INSTOWN 0,5130759 0,394 Not Significant 
MANOWN 0,2109963 0,422 Not Significant 
INDAGRI 0,324361 0,442 Not Significant 
INDMIN 0,4060905 0,086* Significant 
INDPROP -0,138191 0,311 Not Significant 
INDINFRA 0,4973408 0,045** Significant 
INDTRADE -0, 329800 0,962 Not Significant 
Nilai Prob>F = 0,0000 
Nilai Adjusted R2 = 0,5413 
N (Jumlah Observasi) = 544 




AUDITFEE = total audit fees of a firm divided by 1.000.000.000; POLCON = political connection that is 
owned by the company measured by using dummy variable; BOCAC = The effectiveness of the Board of 
Commissioners and Audit Committee score (Hermawan, 2009); SIZE = total assets of the company divided by 
1.000.000.000; SUBS = number of subsidiaries; MANOWN = shareholdings of Directors and Commissioners; 
CURRENT = total current assets to total assets; LIQUID = total current assets to current liabilities; ROA = 
return on assets; LEV = total debt to total assets; BIGN = dummy public accounting firms Big 4 non-Big 4; 
ALTMAN = Altman z-score; INSTOWN = institutional ownership; INDAGRI = the agriculture industry; 
INDMIN = the mining industry; INDPROP = construction property development, real estate, and building 
industry INDINFRA; = infrastructure, utilities and transportation industry; INDTRADE = trade, services and 
investments industry. 
NOTE : * significant at α = 10% ; ** significant at α = 5% ; *** significant α = 1% 
 
CONCLUSION, LIMITATION AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
This study aimed to analyze the effect of the existence of political relations as well as the 
effectiveness of the Board of Commissioners and the effectiveness of the Audit Committee of the 
audit fee. Based on the results of the first hypothesis testing found that the existence of political 
relations positive effect on audit fees. The explanation of these results is that the existence of 
political relations within the company is believed to increase the inherent risk attached to the 
company for their activity of rent seeking behavior and practices towards minority shareholders 
ekpropriasi through political donations given to lobby with the authorities. Therefore, from the 
perspective of the auditors, the company is considered to have a higher risk than other companies 
that do not have political connections and consequently auditors will increase audit effort 
required and the implications for the high fee audit charged (Wahab et al, 2011 ). 
In addition, the results of this study also found that there is a positive influence between 
the effectiveness of the Board of Commissioners and the Audit Committee of the audit fee. The 
results of this study support the argument of the demand side theory which states that the Board 
of Commissioners effective and effective Audit Committee will exert their best to conduct 
surveillance. Therefore, they will ask for better audit quality that has implications for the high 
audit fees to be charged (Gul, 2006). 
There are several limitations in this study. First, this study is lack of audit fees data since 
the companies that are willing to disclose their audit fees data are still limited. Another limitation 
of this study is the subjectivity to assess political connections within a firm. This is because in 
Indonesia there is no trustable resource that can determine the relationship between someone and 
politicians so we can only rely on online mass media information. The last limitation is we did 
not use the effectiveness of BOC and Audit Committee as moderating variables between the 
relationship of political connections and audit fees. Although it is believed that the effectiveness 
of BOC and Audit Committee can make the relationship between the political connections and 
audit fees become weaken. 
The suggestions in this study for further research is to find other sources regarding the 
amount of audit fees incurred by the company apart from its annual report that is expected to 
increase the number of research samples. It is also expected in future studies in order to obtain a 
more credible source related to one's relationship with politicians. Moreover, in the later study 
suggested that the variable effectiveness of the Board of Commissioners and the Audit 
Committee serve as a moderating variable. This is because the presence of the Board of 
Commissioners and the Audit Committee effective believed to weaken the influence of the 
political relations of the audit fee for their more effective monitoring mechanisms so as to reduce 
audit risk assessed by the auditors of the companies that are politically connected. 
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